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We may now consider again the point raised at the end of §3. It was suggested tentatively that the question, «Can machines think?» should be replaced by «Are there imaginable digital computers which would do well in the imitation game?». If we wish we can make this superficially more general and ask «Are there discrete-state machines which would do well?». But in view of the universality property we see that either of these questions is equivalent to this, «Let us fix our attention on one particular digital computer C. Is it true that by modifying this computer to have an adequate storage, suitably increasing its speed of action, and providing it with an appropriate programme, C can be made to play satisfactorily the part of A in the imitation game, the part of B being taken by a man?».

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